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I.

IZTMODUCTION

This article begins with a basic assumption: That between now
and the time of workable international fisheries agreement, at
least a few coastal nations' will take unilateral action in the seas
beyond their presently claimed areas of fishery jurisdiction, ostensibly for the sake of conserving valuable food resources endangered by overfishing (or perhaps in some cases, pollution).
Indeed, unilateral fisheries-protective action has of course already
been taken by several countries (including the United States),2
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Ocean Resources Law
Program, University of Oregon Law School. The author acknowledges and
greatly appreciates the assistance of Mr. David Mackie, a second-year student at the University of Oregon Law School, in the preparation of this
article.
1. The word "nation" will be used throughout this article in place of
the more traditional word "state."
2. Exclusive Fisheries Zone Act (1966), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970).
For claims of other nations, see generally Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dep't of State, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions (International Boundary Study, Series A, Limits in the Seas No. 36, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions].
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and further extensions are presently being contemplated by several nations (including the United States).3
If this initial assumption is correct-and I believe it is-it
might
further be assumed that the predicted extensions of fisheries
jurisdiction will have to be counted as additional steps toward a
division of the world ocean into "national lakes." Certainly there

are many recent extensions of national ocean jurisdictions, unilaterally proclaimed and otherwise, that must be so characterized:

the Truman Proclamation (the Great Precedent for the following),4 the Latin American 200-mile claims, 5 the Convention on
7
6
the Continental Shelf, extra-territorial exclusive fishing zones,
3. While this article was being written, Iceland announced that it plans
to enforce a 50-mile exclusive fishing zone and a 100-mile pollution zone
beginning in the fall of 1972. Seattle Times, Dec. 16, 1971, § G, at 8. Many
developing nations are making similar proposals. NATIONAL FISEm N,
Feb. 1972, § A, at 3, 27. Proposals are continually being made in the
United States Congress for extension of the United States exclusive fishing
zone. For example, in the 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 627 was introduced to
extend United States fishing jurisdiction to at least 50 miles and H.R. 628
and H.R. 1675 were introduced to extend the fishing zone to 200 miles
offshore.
4. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States With
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf (1945); 3 C.F.R. § 67 (1943-48 comp.) [hereinafter cited as
Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf].
5. Argentina claims a 200-mile territorial sea, Decree Law 17,094 (Jan.
4, 1967); Brazil claims a 200-mile territorial sea, Decree 1098 (Mar. 25,
1970); Chile claims a 200 mile territorial sea, Supreme Resolution No. 179
(Apr. 11, 1953); Costa Rica claims a 200-mile fisheries conservation zone,
Decree Law No. 739 (Oct. 4, 1949), Decree Law No. 74 (Oct. 4, 1949);
Ecuador claims a 200-mile territorial sea, Executive Accord (Nov. 10, 1966),
Decree Law 1542 (Nov. 11, 1966); El Salvador claims a 200-mile territorial
sea, Constitution Art. 7 (Sept. 14, 1950); Guinea claims a 130-mile territorial sea, Decree No. 224 (June 3, 1964); Nicaragua claims a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone, Executive Decree 1-L (Apr. 5, 1965); Panama claims a
territorial sea of 200 miles, Law No. 31 (Feb. 2, 1967); Peru claims exclusive fishing jurisdiction to 200 miles, Executive Decree (Aug. 1, 1947);
Uruguay claims a 200-mile territorial sea, Decree (May 12, 1969), Decree
(Dec. 13, 1969). National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions, supra note 2;
See generally Lecuona, The Equador Fisheries Dispute, 2 J. MnuTnvm L.
& Comm. 91 (1970); Loring, The United States-PeruvianFisheries Dispute,
23 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1971).
6. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; Convention on
the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311 (in force June 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Convention
on the Continental Shelf].
7. See, for example, the extra-territorial fishing zones claimed by the
United States: Exclusive Fishing Zone Act (1966), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94

the Canadian anti-pollution legislation, s etc. All purport to be
permanent extensions of exclusive national authority, delimited
by geographical boundaries, and thus contribute to the creeping
disintegration of an important area of the earth's surface that
might otherwise, if given time, be set aside as the "common
heritage of mankind." 9
It is therefore unfortunate that the almost inevitable delay in
reaching international agreement on matters of substance, coupled
with the technology-threat of overfishing, will probably soon
compel some nations to extend themselves further into the sea.
However, as the following discussion is supposed to demonstrate,
unilateral fishery-protection action beyond present limits of jurisdiction need not be characterized as a step toward national lakes
or as a precedent for jurisdictional extensions which can be
characterized as such.
The proposition advanced in this article is undoubtedly an oversimplification. It could even be unworkable. Yet it is, I think,
something that needs to be considered as we approach the scheduled time for the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea.10 The
proposition is this:
(1970); the United Kingdom: Fishery Limits Act of 1964, 12 & 13 Eliz. 2,
c. 72, at 1181; Australia: Fisheries Act 1967, Commonwealth Acts, No. 116,
at 853 (1967). See generally National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions,
supra note 2.
8. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 47 (Can.
(1970) [hereinafter cited:as Canadian Pollution Prevention Act]. For a
good discussion of the Act, see Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution PreventionAct: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 McH. L. REV.
1 (1970). See also Green, InternationalLaw and Canada's Anti-Pollution
Legislation, 50 ORE. L. REv. 462 (1971).
9. See E. Borgese, The Ocean Regime-A Suggested Statute for the
Peaceful Uses of the High Seas and the Sea Bed Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Occasional Paper No. 5, 1968); Nixon, U.S. Policy for the Seabed, 62 DEP'T
STATE. BuLL. 737 (1970).
10. G.A. Res. 2750C (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEG.ALiMATmuAmS 226 (1971).
This is a resolution in which the United Nations General Assembly
Decides to convene in 1973, in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 3 below, a conference on the law of the sea which
would deal with the establishment of an equitable international
regime-including an international machinery-for the area and
the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the area, and a broad range of related issues including those
concerning the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the
territorial sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas (including the
question of the preferential rights of coastal states), the preservation of the marine environment (including inter alia, the prevention of pollution) and scientific research.
See Dole & Stang, Ocean Politics at the United Nations, 50 ORE. L. REv. 378
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In view of the apparent trend toward overexploitation of certain
stocks of the world's commercial fishes, and in light of the proven
incapacity of the international community to come to effective
agreement on any important topic in anything like a timely
fashion, coastal nations ought to be allowed-even, perhaps, encouraged in some instances-to take emergency resource-protective action in the high seas within the following guidelines:
(1) The protective action must be a response to a demonstrable
conservation crisis. (2) The protective action must be concerned
solely with protection of the endangered resource. (3) The protective action must not unreasonably discriminate on the high seas
against nationals of other nations.
(4) The protective action
must carry an automatic termination time. (5) The protective
action must be accompanied by a clear call for international

agreement.
Readers familiar with international fisheries law will recognize
that this proposition borrows from the concepts underlying the
second Truman Proclamation"1 and the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.' 2 In
fact, the non-success (it cannot quite be called failure) of that convention 13 represents one of the obstacles to the proposal advanced
(1971); Pollack, Fisheries Considerations of Ocean Space, 4 NAT. RES. L.
676 (1971).
11. Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, Policy of the United States with
Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas (1945); 3
C.F.R. § 68 (1943-48 comp.) [hereinafter cited as Truman Proclamation on
Fisheries]. A companion executive order contemplated the establishment
of fishery conservation zones. Executive Order No. 9634 (1945); 3 C.F.R.
§ 437 (1943-48 comp.)
12. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April
29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969; 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (in force
March 29, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Fishing and High Seas
Conservation].
13. As of January 1, 1971, only 30 nations had ratified the Convention on
Fishing.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 299 (1971).

In 1969 the

combined catch of these 30 nations made up only 17 percent of the total
world catch. And of this 17 percent the five nations which could be considered fishing powers (Denmark, South Africa, Thailand, United Kingdom,
and the United States) caught 75 percent. 28 FAO, YEARBooK OF FISHERY
STATisTics 1969 § A at 4-11 (1970). See generally Herrington, The Future
of the Geneva Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living
Resources of the Sea, Proceedings of the Conference of the Second Annual
Law of the Sea Institute 62 (1968).

here. But more on that subject will be presented later.14
In the meantime, I will try to demonstrate why unilateral
fisheries action might soon be deemed a necessity and how a nation
taking such action might avoid being characterized as a "national
laker."
II.

THE CRIsIs-CREAToR:

OVEREXPLOITATION

It is common opinion among observers of the international fishof fishing," as one of the traditional
scene ofthat
ing
the"freedom
high seas, 15 is no longer a viable principle of
freedoms
sound fisheries management. 16 In terms of the fishing effort and
techniques which could have been fielded in Grotius' day, when
the principle was supposedly established, 17 it was perhaps reasonably accurate to say that the living resources of the sea were
inexaustible and therefore represented "free goods."1 8 In fact,
such a rationale was apparently found not too difficult to support
as late as 1958, when the principle was re-asserted in an attempted
codification.' 9
We know better today.

Grotius and the Geneva Convention

14. See text accompanying notes 69-72, infra.
15. The traditional doctrine is supposedly "codified" in United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea; Convention on the High Seas, Art. 2
§ 2, April 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
(in force Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited as Convention on the High
Seas].
16. See F. CmusTy & A. SCOTT, THE COiMMONWEALTHn OCEAN FISHERIES
6-7 (1965); FAO, The State of the World's Fisheries 1-5 (World Food
Problems No. 7, 1968); J. CnuTc~nEm= & A. ZELNER, EcoNoArc ASPECTS OF
Tag PACIFIC HALIBUT FIsHERY; Goldie, The Oceans' Resources and International Law-Possible Developments in Regional Fisheries Management,
COLUM. J. TURASNAT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1969). See also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

593-94 (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht, 1955).

17. H. GRomis, ThE FREEDOpm OF THE SEAS 22-44 (1916) (translated with
a Revision of the Latin text of 1633, by Ralph Van Deman Jagoffin). See
generally H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 37-61 (1969); Reppy, The Grotian Doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas Reappraised, 19 FORDHAm L. REV.
243 (1950).
18. The inexhaustibility premise was disputed even in initial responses
to Grotius. See T.FULTON, THE SOVERIGNTY OF THE SEA 548 (1911):
Welwood, Selden, and many others, held, in opposition to Grotius
and his school, that the fisheries along a coast might be exhausted
or injured by promiscuous fishing, and that the inhabitants of the
coast had a primary right to the fractus of the adjacent sea, as
against the intrusion of foreigners-a principle which lay at the
root of the Scottish claims to the reserved waters.
19. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15, Art. 2 § 2. But, in the
exercise of freedom of fishing, the nation must take into account the interests of other nations and the interests of conservation of the living resources.
IIINT'L L. Comn'N, Commentaries on the Draft Articles on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. Doc. A/3159, Art. 27 (1956).
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framers were wrong not so much in their respective assessments
of then-existing fishing capabilities and fish supplies as in their
inability to predict the tremendous impact of technology on these
20
matters. Grotius, at least, can be excused.
Today we are confronted with many technology crises which
challenge the existing order of our society. The society represented by the community of nations is not immune. New and
growing technology in the field of ocean mining accounts for
21
much of the current rethinking about international institutions;
ocean weapons technology, known and suspected, adds its share
of concern; 2 2 ocean transportation is bein technologically revamped on a large scale and thus presents potential threats to
freedom of navigation; 23 technology has opened up the sea to
uses unsuspected a short time ago.
New and coming fishing technology now threatens the ancient
practice of free ocean fishing. Larger and faster boats, improved
fishing gear and fishing techniques, high seas processing, and
more fishing nations have made fishing a major international
activity.24

This tremendous increase in fishing effort2 5 and fish-

ing ability has made it possible to exploit stocks which a few dec20. Excused not only because of his failure to foresee the much later impact of technology, but also because he was probably not really concerned

with fishing rights when he drafted Mare Liberum (i.e., THE FREEDOM OF
THE SEAS, supra note 17). See Reppy, supra note 17, at 263. And not everyone agreed, even in Grotius' time, that the seas were inexhaustible. See
Knight, supra note 17, at 55-73.
21. See ComznVssIoN ON _AnuuE ScI~cE, ENGINEERING, AND REsOURcES,
PANEL REPORT, INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-42, Part 2, 91st

Cong., 1st Sess. at VI, 161-221 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STRATTON

PANEL

REPORT 2].

22. See E. Brown, Arms Control in Hydrospace: Legal Aspects 1-36
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars-Ocean Series 301,
1971); Breckner, Some Dimensions of Defense Interest in the Legal Delimitations of the Continental Shelf, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 188 (1970).
23. STRATTON PANEL REPORT 2, supranote 21, at VI, 115-21.
24. See FAO, FISHERIES

IN THE

FOOD EcoNomy 41-45 (Freedom from hun-

ger Campaign-Basic Study No. 19, 1968).
25. In 1850, the total world catch of fish and shellfish products was
(excluding whales) between 1.5 and 2.0 million metric tons; in
1900, about 4.0 million tons; in 1930, about 10.0 million tons; in
1950, about 20.0 million tons; in 1960, 38.0 million tons; in 1965,
52.4 million tons; and in 1968, 64 million metric tons.
Chapman, The Theory and Practice of International Fishery DevelopmentManagement, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 408, 414 (1970).

ades ago were not feasible and has resulted in an increasing
number of overfished stocks. 2 6 In the face of rapidly increasing

demand for food fish,27 the classical response to overfishing moving
to another stock is no longer as viable as it used to be.28 The need
for sound management has become critical. 29
New fisheries technology and the prediction of overfishing
crises have caused concern on at least two levels: (a) the "objective" level-represented by fisheries scientists, academicians,
policy makers, and the like-who are worried about the preservation of important food resources for the hungry of today's and
tomorrow's world populations; 30 and (b) the "subjective" level26. In 1949 a group of fishery experts believed the only fish stocks in
need of serious management to be a few high-priced species like plaice in
the North Sea and salmon and halibut in the northeast Pacific. However,
in 1968, about half of some 30 stocks believed underfished in 1949 were in
need of protection.

FAO, THE STATE

OF THE

WORLD FISHERIES I (World

Food Problems No. 7, 1968).
27. It is estimated that by 1985 the world demand for food fish will be
65 to 100 per cent greater that the 1965 catch. This growth will result
from a 33 to 50 per cent increase in demand from the developed nations,
a 90 to 150 per cent increase from the centrally planned countries (includes
mainland China), and a 100 to 160 per cent increase from the developing
nations. FAO, FIsHEREs IN THE FOOD ECONOMY, supra note 24, at 60. See
generally Holt, The Food Resources of the Ocean, 221 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
Sept. 1969, at 178.
28. The FAO predicts that by 1990 few substantial stocks capable of being
harvested with modern fishing gear will remain unexploited. FAO, FISHERIEs nT THE FOOD ECONOlvY, supra note 24, at 38-39.
29. Further potential danger to the living resources of the sea comes
from the threat of pollution. Most pollutants reach the oceans from landbased sources, over which the coastal nation can exercise little control (except, of course, for those sources within its own land boundaries). See
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:
SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROGRAMS FOR UNDERSTANDING MAN'S EFFECT ON THE OCEANS

(1971), where it is suggested that most pollutants (including 95 per cent of
the petroleum) reach the oceans through the atmosphere. Coastal nations
are now beginning to take unilateral action in the high seas to protect
themselves and fisheries from the dangers of oil pollution resulting from
accidental spills and intentional discharges. Canada and Norway have
taken such action. Canadian Pollution Prevention Act, supra note 8; Law
No. 6 of Mar. 6, 1970, [1970] Lovtid 335. See Swan, International and
National Approaches to Oil PollutionResponsibility: An Emerging Regime
for a Global Problem, 50 ORE. L. REV. 506, 570-72 (1971). Iceland plans to
enforce a 100-mile pollution zone beginning in late 1972. NATIONAL FISHERMAN, Feb., 1972, § A at 27.
30. See generally F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, supra note 16; J. CRUTCHFIELD

& G.

PoNTEcoRvo, THE PACIFIC SALMON FIsHERIEs-A STUDY IN IRRATIONAL
CONSERVATION (1969); CoMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND
RESOURCES, REPORT, OUR NATION AND THE SEA, H.R. Doc. No. 91-42, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 88-94 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STRATTON COMMISSION
REPORT]. For a discussion on the STRATTON COMMISSION REPORT'S recom-

mendations regarding fishing, see Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 286-359 (1970).
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represented mainly by fishermen and their representatives-who
foresee real threats to their livelihoods in the depletion of fish
stocks upon which they depend.31 The basic assumption at the
start of this article-that unilateral fisheries-protective action on
the high seas will be taken soon by some nations-is in turn
founded on the assumption that pressures emanating from one or
both of these two levels will in fact cause the unilateral fisheries
jurisdictional extensions to be undertaken.
Certainly, in view of the seemingly inevitable overfishing crises,
it would be a good idea for somebody to act for the purpose of
conserving important fish resources. But does that somebody
have to be single nations acting on their own?
III.

THE ULTImATE SOLUTION:

THE DESIRABMITY

OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

The 70 percent of our planet's surface covered by ocean is the
vast stage now set for the drama in which man will perform
acts determinative of his essential character as an organized species of intelligent life for generations to come. Perhaps it would
be even more appropriate to view this immense area as the field
fate has selected for an impending battle whose significance
may well eclipse that of the skirmishes fought at Salamis and
Waterloo. Whatever the metaphor, important things are about to
happen in the ocean. In this decade and much of the next, we of
the present generation will be forced to decide whether it is
really possible for man in his present condition to administer an
incredibly valuable world resource for the shared benefit of all
men everywhere. No matter what our decision ultimately will
be, men living hundreds of years in the future will be affected
by it. It is an awesome responsibility, and there is no way we
can avoid it.
Two scenarios represent the opposite ends of a spectrum of
scenarios covering the possible results of our decades of decision
in the ocean:
(1) In the 1970's and 80's, the nations of the earth continue to
31. See Wakefield, Fishing Interests on the Shelf, Proceeding of the Third

Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 230 (1969); Wedin, Im-

pact of Distant Water on Coastal Fisheries, Proceedings of the Second An-

nual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 14 (1968).

debate and disagree on the structure of a regime for management
of the ocean's resources. In the meantime, the coastal nations
continue to expand their self-proclaimed authorities farther out
to sea, until it finally becomes apparent to the debaters that there
is really very little left to argue about. By that time, most of the
ocean has been sliced up into segments claimed by the coastal
nations. Conflicts between coastal nations over particularily rich
areas of ocean develop, harsh words are exchanged, fleets are mobilized, shots are fired, missiles are launched, and the world goes
up in flame, proving what many have long suspected: that man
is really an unsuccessful species of life.
(2) On the other extreme, a much more pleasant prospect
invites consideration. Suppose that the upcoming Law of the Sea
Conference meets with great success-success in the sense that
out of it comes the seed from which grows a new world organization devoted to the principle that the ocean's wealth is the common heritage of all mankind. Eventually, under the guiding
hand of the new organization, the sea's resources, mineral and
living, are developed and harvested and distributed in such a way
as to eliminate poverty and hunger from all corners of the earth.
The nations, occupying the land, are thus shown the hitherto
suspected but undemonstrated advantages of world-wide cooperative effort, old barriers to international cooperation fall, a new
world order is established, and wars are forgotten, thus proving
what a few have suspected: once shown the way, all men can
be brothers.
Obviously, neither of these extremes is likely to happen. What
is likely to happen will probably look more like the first scenario
than the second. But I think most of us would prefer to leave
something like the second scenario for future generations to inherit. 32 So what we must do is keep the second goal in mind while
rejecting those avenues which might lead toward the first.
This all means, of course, that in dealing with any matter affecting that largely unregulated area of the earth's surface that
man now calls "high seas"--certainly in the case of international
fisheries-the international community should, as a general rule,
reject any further attempt of nations unilaterally to extend their
seaward jurisdictions. International agreement of some form (including regional agreement between nations) is the desirable end
solution to the problems which engender such moves.
32. Again, a gross assumption. Contra, Eisenbud, Understanding the
InternationalFisheriesDebate, 4 NAT. Rus. L. 19, 38-39 (1971).
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International management also has some more immediate, practical advantages. As to most swimming resources of the high seas,
lines drawn seaward as extensions of national land boundaries,
no matter how far these lines go, tend to result in arbitrary
divisions of the geographical area occupied by the resource. Truly
effective management will, logically, require unitary control of
the whole area of the resource-and, perhaps, the entire area of
the ecological unit of which the resource is a part. Furthermore,
the great expense of administering, enforcing and scientifically
monitoring the progress of a management scheme should be reduced and more easily borne by a single international manager.
In sum, fractionalized management would not only be inefficient
but would, in the long run, undoubtedly fail.3 3 International
agreement on management plans is the only real long-term answer.
But we cannot forget two important realities taught to us by
recent history: (1) Technology tumbles forward at an incredible
pace, feeding on itself and accelerating as it goes. (2) Despite
the aids of technology (such as jet planes and communication
satellites), workable international agreement on any important
topic still takes a long, long time to accomplish. It is doubtful
that technology will await the pleasure of the diplomats.
The nations are therefore presently faced with a slightly different fisheries problem: Not what to do eventually about management of the sea's living resources, but what to do now to
bridge the gap between the present and that desirable eventuality,
to forestall the effects of overfishing which we are about to inherit
from advancing technology.
33. A similar statement has been made about existing international
agreements:
The coverage of the fishery conventions is inadequate in another
crucial way. Taken together, they apply to only a small part of
the actual and even smaller part of the potential catch from the
world's fisheries. At present, too, no international organization
has been explicitly entrusted with the task of taking a world-wide
view and making recommendations that will result in the creation
of a world-wide system of regional fishery conventions able to
anticipate difficulties and to assure the conserving and economically efficient utilization of the living resources of the high seas.
ScIENcE, ENGINEERING, m RESOURCEs, PANm REComnvssioN ON Mun
PORT, MARINE REsouRcEs AND LEG -PornricAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TE=
DEVELOPMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 91-42, Part 3, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at VEiI-55

(1969) [hereinafter cited as S

OATTON
PAx

REPORT 3].

IV.

THE ImmEDIATE SoLUTIoN:

CAREFUL UNILATERAL ACTION

The present system for "management" of high seas resources
illustrates perfectly the horrible mis-meshing of the two rates of
movement represented by technology's rapid pace and the international community's turtle-like response to regulatory needs. It
has been known for some years now that the ocean's food resources are not, as originally thought, limitless. 34 It has therefore
been quite obvious for some time that these important resources
need to be carefully managed.3 5 Yet despite this knowledge on
the part of individuals and nations, the international community
(the present instrument of high seas "management") continues
officially to view the sea's resources as "free goods"-free for the
taking by anyone who has the desire and the ability to take.30 The
desire continues and the ability increases, the danger of overfishing threatens the food resources, and the international organism
remains helplessly stuck in first gear, ponderously trying to move
to cut off the threat.
Perhaps it will move in time to save the bulk of the endangered
resources. Some will undoubtedly be saved by bilateral and regionally multilateral action, by both existing mechanisms and
those to be created. 37 But some will, tragically, not be saved by
international action or, perhaps, at all.3 8 The creation and operation of the necessary saving mechanisms comes about too slowly.30
34. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
35. See authorities cited in notes 16 & 30 supra.
36. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, THm ENVIRONMENTAL
HANDBOoK 31 (ed. G. de Bell, 1970), where the writer demonstrates the
dangers in a common-property approach to a limited resource.

37. See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON OCEANOGRAPHIC RESOURCES, FISHERIES, AND WILDLIFE

TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). See
also Lucas, International Fishery Bodies of the North Atlantic (Law of the
Sea Institute, Occasional Paper No. 5 ,1970); Chapman, supra note 25, at
417-52.
38. The greatest failure of all the international fishery bodies has been
the International Commission on Whaling. Its basic purpose was not the
protection of whale stocks, but rather the protection of the investment
nations had in whaling. Quotas, established on almost no scientific information, were much too large and nearly caused the extinction of several
species of whale. The Commission has yet to adopt a sensible system for
establishing quotas, although they are now low enough that, for the time
being, the whale is perhaps out of danger. Chapman, supra note 25, at
427-30.
39. Indeed, a few of the organizations have fair successes to their
credit. The fact is, however, that the fisheries have been changing
faster than the international machinery to deal with them....
Nations have given, and continue to give, ludicrously low-level
support to the bodies of which they are members, and the bodies
themselves do not have the powers they need properly to manage

[voL. 9: 454, 1972]

Int'l FisheriesAgreement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Unlike the international regulatory mechanisms, the mechanisms of most national governments are of course capable of responding more quickly to crises. And where international
mechanisms fail to respond to developments considered by certain
nations to be of crisis proportions, is it not likely that at least
some of these nations will take what they deem to be appropriate
responses unilaterally? Indeed, the unilateral extensions of seaward sovereignty by the Latin American countries can certainly
be classified in large degree as reactions to what these nations
felt to be a failure of international mechanisms to respond to
fisheries crises. 40 Or, to take a more recent analagous example,
the Canadian arctic legislation asserting exclusive pollutioncontrol jurisdiction into the high seas must be viewed as a unilateral response to the slow-motion nature of international mech4
anisms. '
the fisheries and conserve the resources. Add to this the trend to
high mobility and range of today's fishing fleets, the problems of
species interaction and the growing number of nations at various
stages of economic development participating in international fisheries, and the regional bodies are indeed in trouble!
Holt, supra note 27, at 191.
This impotence of international fishery bodies has forced many coastal
states to take a hard look at unilateral protective action. For example, the
Ivory Coast delegation to a preliminary meeting for the Law of the Sea
Conference in 1973 remarked that "subjecting fisheries to international
organization is the way of ultimate solution, but coastal states cannot wait."
NATIONAL FIsHuvmiAN, Feb., 1972, § A, at 3. Hans G. Andersen (Iceland's
ambassador to Norway), in announcing his country's proposed extension of
its exclusive fishing zone, said, "We cannot wait-we will not wait." Seattle Times, Dec. 16, 1971, § G, at 8.
40. "[l]f regional precedents are any indications, it is perhaps not too
surprising that Chile, Peru and Ecuador feel wary about entering into
agreements with maritime powers larger than themselves." Lecuona, supra
note 5, at 104. Also, "Chile's 200 mile territorial sea claim was supported
in great part by its desire to avoid the regulations established by the International Commission on Whaling." Chapman, supra note 25, at 429.
41. A Canadian defender of his country's anti-pollution legislation recently stated:
[B]y and large all we have done is to carry out exactly what the
world community told us to do, and what the international agreements haven't done. The world community has consistently said,
"Governments, get on with it." The international convention
hasn't got on with it effectively. We might have loaded the charge
of dynamite that makes others begin to get on with the realization,
"By god, somebody really means it!"
Green, Canada's Anti-Pollution Legislation: Oral Proceedings, 50 ORE. L.
REv.491, 492-93 (1971). See also Bilder, supra note 8, at 2-3.

The Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for 1973 should
probably not be looked to as the place where international solution to the high seas fisheries problem will be finally assembled.
The Conference will have a vast array of ocean issues to deal
with; 4 2 and even if it is successful beyond the most optimistic of
present expectations in its handling of the fisheries issue, there
is not likely to be any effective, working management program
43
for many years to come.

The tragedy of delay in international agreement on high seas
fisheries is found in the apparent dilemma it presents to some
fishing nations: on the one hand, such a nation can await the
ultimate agreement of the international community and thereby possibly watch the substantial deterioration or destruction of important
food resources upon which its economy has come to depend and
which should be preserved for future generations; or, on the other
hand, the nation can attempt a unilateral extension of fisheries
jurisdiction (or sovereignty) for the purpose of maintaining the
endangered resource and thereby add to the division of the world
ocean into national seas (and perhaps breach a treaty obligation
as well) . 44 In a real crisis a nation that feels the crunch will
probably choose the short-term but clearly definable benefits of
immediate resource-protective action to the long-term and nebulous benefits of awaiting international agreement. And perhaps
such a nation will be right.
Again, my assumption is that unilateral fisheries-protective
action will be taken before international agreement gets around
to meeting the coming fisheries crises. But my main purpose is
to suggest that a nation which ultimately feels constrained to act
unilaterally need not face the dilemma as presented above. There
is, I think, a middle ground which will allow a nation to act to
preserve important fisheries, which will not necessarily contribute
to a national division of the high seas, and which will encourage
international action on fisheries conservation.
The suggested solution is temporary, resource-related, nondiscriminatory unilateral action in response to a real conservation
crisis.
V. TnE Fo m

OF UNILATERAL

ACTION

If one accepts the premise that there are greater values to be
served by eventual international or supranational management
42. See note 10, supra, for discussion.
43. See NATIONAL FIsHEumA, Feb., 1972, § A, 3, 27.
44. See text accompanying notes 73-89, infra.
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of ocean resources than by continued non-management ("freedom
of the seas") or fractionalized national management, then there
have been several things wrong with the recent national resourceprotective moves into the open seas. At least the following objections appear:
(1) The claimed extensions are often delimited by geographic
lines not reasonably related to the area occupied by the resource
to be protected. This is especially true in the case of fisheries-'
protective action. The extensions therefore appear to be boundary-related rather than resource-related.
(2) The claims are often capable of being characterized as
"over-kill" measures-that is, extensions of sovereignty or na-.
tional jurisdiction encompassing more claimed authority than
required for protection of the resource.
(3) The claims have often been accompanied by stated-and,
sometimes, enforced-management policies that grossly discriminate in favor of the claimant nations.
(4) The claimed extensions have all been presented as permanent.
The sum total of these factors, if the claims are given credence,
means that nations-and not just soon-to-be-discarded bits of
national authority-are expanding and the high seas are shrinking.
This is, as already suggested, a trend toward potentially monumental dangers.
The problem resolves itself, then, to one which can be stated
simply: Can a nation unilaterally act in the high seas to protect
fisheries resources which it "subjectively" would like to preserve
for its own benefit, or which it "objectively" would like to see
preserved for future generations, without contributing to the
trend toward a division of the world ocean into national territories? I think the answer is "maybe." Such unilateral action,
must, however, convincingly appear to be a voluntary undertaking
of the task of managing a high seas resource substantially for the
benefit of the world community (though it might have as a partial
purpose the safeguarding of the actor's own share of that resource) pending permanent international agreement.
Unilateral fisheries-protective action might have a chance if it
is carefully planned and executed according to the following
guidelines.

A.

The protective action must be a response to a demonstrable
conservation crisis.

This, like the following factors, is essentially a requirement of
a showing of "good faith." To have a chance of indicating to
the world community its ultimate desire for international management, a nation claiming unilateral fisheries authority in the
high seas must be convincing in its posture as a protector or
custodian of an international resource. Any claim clearly based
on a selfish grab for an added portion of ocean space is bound
to be viewed as a bad faith, uncooperative move prompted solely by
the "subjective" appetite for a greater share of fish resources; more
importantly, it is likely to be met with opposition from some
rather strong sources. 45 Even a claim patently based upon a
demonstrated conservation crisis will probably find some opposition, but the demonstrable-crisis requirement would seem to be a
crucial premise for any unilateral fisheries-protective extension
if such an extension is to have any possibility of success in terms
of the final goal of international management.
The problem lies of course in demonstrating to the international
community that a conservation crisis does in fact exist. Much
depends on the definition to be given to the word "crisis." Is its
meaning restricted to its "objective" sense, so that the only relevant inquiry is whether there is an imminent threat to the worldcommunity interest in conserving the fishery? This is probably too
much to expect; in view of the recent tendency of many fishing
nations to recognize the principle of coastal-nation preference in
respect to adjacent fisheries, 46 a nation claiming management
jurisdiction over nearby high seas fisheries ought to be able to
concede that a special "subjective" interest in the immediate
45. It has become increasingly difficult for one nation to move unilaterally effectively in excluding, or hampering, the operations of
fishermen of other nations in the high seas simply to gain preferential advantage in that fishery for its own nationals. Such actions
tend to provide the offending nation with a bad international public image, which is not beneficial diplomatically in these times.
Chapman, supra note 25, at 408. See also S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
OF SEA REsoURcEs 21-35 (1962).

46. See Convention on Fishing and High Seas Conservation, supra note
12, at Art. 6; STRATToN CoimvmIssiox REPORT, supra note 30, at 110; Draft
Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted by the United States, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 4 (1971) (submitted to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, July 30, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and Fishing].
See also Schaefer, Some Recent Developments Concerning Fishing and the
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 7 SAN DIEO L.
REV. 371, 398-405 (1970).
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regulation of the endangered resource colors its determination of
a "crisis" without destroying the credibility of its "international
protector" claim or risking fatal opposition to its unilateral extension-so long as it is also convincing in its showing that there
is at least some not-too-long-term threat to the international
interest. That is, a coastal nation which can demonstrate that its
economy is in serious trouble because of overfishing of an adjacent
fishery upon which it has come to depend might get away with
a claim of "crisis" even though there is no immediate threat of
extinction of the particular species or any other imminent danger
to the international community's short-term interest in conserving
the fishery. However, there should also be a showing that the
continuance of the present regulation (or non-regulation, as the
case may be) will, in the near future, lead at least to a very
4
serious reduction of the fishery's physical yield. 7
A similar crisis determination is a prerequisite for the more
limited allowance of unilateral conservation management found
in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas:
2. The measures which the coastal state adopts under the previous paragraph [authorizing "unilateral measures of conservation" after six months of unsuccessful attempts at international
agreement] shall be valid as to other states only if the following
requirements are fulfilled:
(a) That there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures in the light of existing knowledge of the
fishery;
(b) That the measures adopted are based on appropriate
scientific findings .... 48
The requirement that the showing of a conservation crisis be
based on scientific findings is one not often easy to meet.49 But
it would seem necessary that the claimant nation base its claim
47. Since it is highly unlikely that a stock of fish could be exploited to
extinction (except for slowly reproducing stocks of mammals like whalessee note 38 supra), it is important that criteria for defining depletion be
established. For the difficulties in defining depletion, see F. CHmssr & A.
ScoTT, supra note 16, at 80-86.
48. Convention on Fishing and High Seas Conservation, supra note 12,
Art. 7, § 2 (a & b).

49. See K. McDoucAL & W. BURxE, PuBLic ORDER or =H OcEAs 994-95
(1962); see also Jackson, Some Observations on the Future Growth of
World Fisheries and the Nature of the Conservation Problems, Proceedings
of the Second Annual Conference on the Law of the Sea Institute 2 (1969).

that the fishery's yield is rapidly dwindling on some kind of
reliable evidence. It might be questioned whether evidence that
the coastal nation's total landings have decreased is either "appropriate" or "scientific." Yet this is likely to be the sort of evidence
that is most available to many nations and provides a primary
reason for contemplating unilateral action. Evidence of a decline
in -the. coastal nation's yield should not_however, standing alone,
be sufficient for sh-owingofa "crisis.' '
B. The protective action must be concerned solely with protection of the endangeredresource.
As noted already, some recent unilateral extensions of national

jurisdiction tend to be more territory or sovereignty oriented than
resource oriented. Either the extension is delineated by strict
geographic boundaries or the proclaimed authority embraces more
than is required to meet the coastal nation's immediate concern,
or both. The claimant nation thus gives the impression (sometimes accurate) that it is primarily concerned with expanding
its own existence. A nation concerned with the conservation of a
high seas resource would probably increase the acceptability of a
unilateral extension of authority to meet that concern if it limits
the extended jurisdictional control specifically to the resource to
be protected. Geographically, the new jurisdiction should cover
the area or areas inhabited by the fish resource, wherever that
may be, and no others;50 similarly, the claimed authority should
not be substantively broader than required for the protection of
the resource.
For example, if the fish resource to be protected is an anadromous species spawned in the coastal nation and the threat is
overfishing, the unilaterally extended authority can and should
geographically follow (but be limited to) the entire migratory
pattern of the fish; and it should not attempt to affect any high
seas activities unrelated to fishing the species. If the threat is
high seas pollution, then the asserted control should be directed
only to pollution prevention.
Again, the purpose of these resource-relationship limitations on
unilateral action is to enhance the credibility of the claimant's
position. 51
50. But where the resource is part of a highly integrated ecological unit,
effective regulation of the endangered resource requires regulation of the
whole unit. See F. CHriSTy & A. SCOTT, supra note 30, at 78-80.
51. Several resource-oriented multilateral agreements are currently in
effect. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,
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C. The protective action must not unreasonably discriminate on
the high seas againstnationalsof other nations.
Like a unilateral claim not demonstrably in response to a conservation crisis, a claim that appears to be a grab for exclusive
access to a high seas fishery will probably not be acceptable to,
or acquiesced in by a substantial number of the rest of the nations.
The management policy and procedures of the new "resource
custodian" should not be designed to assign a substantially greater
share of the resource to the custodian.
On the other hand, a unilateral claim to some sort of preference
for the claimant nation may not be viewed unfavorably. Coastalnation preference is, as already noted, apparently becoming more
widely accepted as a general principle of high-seas fisheries management.5 2 Therefore, to an extent, the coastal-nation claimant
just might receive an understanding response even if its unilateral
management regulations tend to favor its own coastal fishermenbut only to an extent. The line between a possibly acceptable
claim to a moderate preference and an unacceptable selfish grab
is still indistinct; a claimant nation would be well advised to err
on the side of the smaller preference.
The essential difficulty here is, of course, allocation of the unilaterally managed fishery's benefits between the custodian and
the various other nations having some sort of fishing experience
in the fishery. This allocation-of-benefits problem has been at
the heart of the international fisheries hassle and has been responsible in large part for the failure of the world's nations to
agree successfully on management schemes for many high seas
fisheries.55 At least the difficulty of obtaining agreement on a
(opened for signature May 14, 1966), [1968] 20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No.

6767 (in force March 21, 1966); Convention for the Establishment of an
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, (opened for signature May 31,
1949), [1950] 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (in force March
3, 1950). For a proposed world tuna Convention, see Kask, Tuna-A World
Resource App. I (Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1969).
See also Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, (opened for signature
Sept. 24, 1931), [1935] 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. 880, 3 Bevans 26, 155 L.N.T.S. 349
(in force Jan. 16, 1935); Interim Convention on Conservation of North
Pacific Fur Seals, (opened for signature Feb. 9, 1957), [1957] 8 U.S.T. 2283,
T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 (in force Oct. 14, 1957).

52. See text accompanying note 46 supra.

53. "The roadblock to conservation normally is reduced to a question of

particular system of apportionment could be solved-or, rather,
obviated-by unilateral management. However, the custodiannation would, it seems, have to be careful not to grossly discriminate against foreign fishermen in order to maintain a convincing
"protective" posture.
D. The protective action must carry an automatic termination
time.
Of the five proposed guidelines for unilateral action, the proposals that the action be self-terminating and be accompanied by
a call for international agreements are the guidelines especially
tailored to unilateral action and therefore have not been discussed
in the literature devoted to general questions of fishery management. The termination provision might work something like this:
the legislation or proclamation (or whatever means the nation
uses to assert its management responsibility) should include an
express clause stating that the newly claimed authority will terminate on a certain date in the future or on the effective date of any
acceptable international management agreement, whichever date
is earlier. The termination date might be many years in the
future; the important thing is that there be a termination clause
so that the unilateral action can be classifiable as a stop-gap
measure pending international agreement.
Of course, it is possible that the termination date will arrive
without the conclusion of acceptable international agreement, and
there would be nothing to prevent the custodian-nation from
further extending the time of its unilateral management. But
such a prolongation (if it, too, carries a new termination date)
would not destroy the proclaimed temporary nature of the unilateral action: it would still be self-terminating by design and
thus incapable of being categorized as a permanent national
boundary extension.
E. The protective action must be accompanied by a clear call
for internationalagreement.
That the unilateral extension of management authority be accompanied by a call for international management is an obvious
credibility requirement. If the claimant nation is truly interested
in an eventual international solution it should say so and, beyond
division of the wealth created by ... conservation efforts." Chapman,
supra note 25, at 444. For a proposed allocation system, see U.S. Draft
Articles on the Territorial Sea and Fishing, supra note 46, at Art. III, § 2.
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the mere statement, might take some steps to get the international
machinery rolling in higher gear. For example, a draft treaty
or convention might be submitted to an appropriate international
body or gathering."4 At a minimum the claimant nation should,
in an appropriate forum, call upon the world community to start
or hasten its deliberations on fisheries conservation and regulation.
And, of course, subsequent cooperation by the custodian nation
in the international deliberation process would be essential to the
maintenance of credibility.
VI.

MAJOR OBsTAcLEs AiN

DimcU= S

There are, of course, many obstacles to and difficulties with
implementing unilateral fisheries-protective action, even assuming
that following the suggested guidelines gives credence to the
claimant nation's asserted "custodian" status. At a minimum,
there are the following major problems: (1) "legal" obstacles
under international law; (2) formulation of management methods;
(3) enforcement problems; and (4) risk of over-response by other
nations.
A. "Legal" obstacles under internationallaw.
Unilateral fishery-protective action is bound to run up against
fairly formidable legal obstacles; or, more accurately perhaps, the
claimant nation will have to be prepared to meet some opposition
arguments having sound bases in the set of norms we have come
to call international law. Certainly freedom of fishing, as one
of the fundamental, customarily recognized freedoms of the high
seas, will have to be reckoned with. In addition, the claimant
nation may be a party to one or more treaties that expressly or
implicitly prohibit unilateral management of the high seas fishery.
Although freedom of fishing has long guaranteed communityresource status to fish located on the high seas-thus prohibiting
any single nation from restricting the fishing activities of any
54. E.g., the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference, see note 10, supra; subsequent international conferences; or presently constituted world oganizations
like FAO.

other nation beyond the territorial sea55-the principle has recently come under attack, both by the actions of individual
nations and in the writings of some international-law commentators. 56
As already noted in another context, 51 several nations have in
recent years asserted unilateral jurisdiction over fishing grounds
which had prior to the unilateral assertions been universally recognized as part of the high seas and thus subject to the freedomof-fishing principle. There is more than a suggestion that this
spate of unilateral expansion found its initial impetus in the 1945
Truman Proclamations.5 8 In the first proclamation, the United
States President asserted his country's exclusive right to control
the exploitation of all resources, living and mineral, of the U.S.
Continental shelf beyond the three-mile territorial sea. The second proclamation claimed the right of the United States to establish and regulate high seas conservation zones for fisheries.
The response to these two proclamations by other nations was
somewhat surprising: instead of rejection-imitation. In machinegun succession, compared to the usual pace of international-law
developments, individuals in the world community extended their
jurisdictional boundaries farther out to sea. In what still seems
to some a grotesque exaggeration of the Truman precedent, several Latin American countries claimed various sorts of sovereignty
over huge areas of high seas.5 9 Other nations followed suit. The
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, while reasserting
freedom of fishing, excepted "sedentary species" on the continental shelf from the doctrine's application. 0 The even more
recent practice by narrow-territorial sea nations of claiming exclusive fishing zones out to 12 miles from shore (exemplified by
55. See text accompanying notes 15-19, supra.

56. [T]here is much more doubt that the oceans or their fisheries

are inexhaustible. While it may be impossible to destroy some
species of fish by today's fishing methods, it is possible to deplete
a species; and it is certainly possible to raise the productivity of
the seas by means analogous to those which have justified private
property in land. Consequently, it is not surprising that to many
people the freedom of the seas, no longer based on unassailable
assumptions, is something less than an article of faith.
F. Cmussy & A. Scow, supra note 16, at 179. See also Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas, 8 NAT. REs. J. 424, 425-428 (1968).
57. See text accompanying notes 4-9, supra.
58. See notes 4 and 11, supra.
59. See note 5, supra.
60. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15; Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 6. See S. ODA, supra note 45, at 181-95; Goldie,
Sedentary Fisheriesand Article 2 (4) of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf-A Plan for a Separate Regime, 63 Amw. J. INT'L L. 86 (1969).
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the U.S. zone 61 ) has been followed by many nations. 62 The
expansionist trend continues to the present, with Canada and Iceland being the most prominent current examples.6 3
This pattern of erosion of the freedom-to-fish concept is of
course extremely significant in the international society, where
norms of acceptable conduct are not legislated but are established
by the practice of nations.6 4 The only safe conclusion that can
be drawn from the continuing practice of nations with respect
to high seas fisheries is that freedom of fishing is not what it
used to be. Whether it will disappear entirely or only become a
limited concept is not clear at this point; but it is trending away
from the almost universally accepted doctrine of the past.
This means, of course, that a nation asserting unilateral fisheries jurisdiction can respond with some force to the argument
that it is "breaking" the "law" prohibiting restrictions on freedom
of fishing: it can answer that it is only a part of the trend away
from strict application of the freedom-to-fish principle and that
in the international community this is the traditionally accepted
way of establishing new norms of conduct.6 5 This is of course a
61. Exclusive Fishing Zone Act (1966), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970).
62. See note 7 supra.
63. Canadian Pollution Prevention Act; Seattle Times, Dec. 16, 1971, § G,
at 8.
64. See J. B1rmLY, THE LAw OF NATioNs 59-62 (6th ed., 1963); Kunz,

Nature of Customary International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 662 (1953);
Wright, Custom as a Basis for International Law in the Post-War World,

2

TEXAs INTL

L. FORUM

147 (1966).

65. From the perspective of realistic description, the international
law of the sea is not a mere static body of rules but is rather a
whole decision making process, a public order which includes a
structure of authorized decision-makers as well as a body of highly
flexible, inherited prescriptions. It is, in other words, a process of

continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response, in

which the decision-makers of particular nation states unilaterally
put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character
to the use of the world's seas, and in which other decision-makers,
external to the demanding state and including both national and
international officials, weigh and appraise these competing claims
in terms of the interests of the world community and of the rival
claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them. As such a process,
it is a living, growing law, grounded in the practices and sanctioning expectations of nationstate officials, and changing as their
demands and expectations are changed by the exigencies of new
interests and technology and by other continually evolving conditions in the world arena.
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the InternationalLaw of the Sea,
49 Aa. J. INTL. L. 356, 356-57 (1955).

technical response that unfortunately relies upon questionably appropriate past acts as precedents. But it is, nevertheless, a fairly
strong response to the argument based on the freedom-of-fishing
doctrine.
A more comfortable response to that argument lies in documenting the reasons why freedom of fishing is no longer considered
by many to be a valid principle of fisheries management. Essentially those reasons can of course be attributed to the increased demand (due to population growth) and vastly increased
ability to harvest (due to technological development) in the
face of relatively constant supply of food fishes.0 0 In fact, because we are dealing with "living goods" in a wild (unregulated)
state, the greatly expanded fishing capability and effort has adversely affected the supply of several important species.0 7 Therefore, a fundamental premise upon which freedom to fish was
originally constructed-that the supply is inexhaustible6 8 -has, in
recent times, collapsed. And-to put it metaphorically and rhetorically-if the cornerstone crumbles, should not the house soon
follow?
So while a self-proclaimed custodian might be accused of breaking new legal ground in assuming temporary custodian status,
it would arguably not be guilty of breaking the old freedom-to-fish
"law."
Nevertheless, the failure of the Convention on Fishing and High
Seas Conservation 609 to become widely adopted provides some basis
for the assertion that freedom of fishing is still immune to unilateral conservation management. From the fact that only five ma0
jor fishing nations have so far become parties to the convention,7
it can be reasoned that those who are most concerned about conservation of high seas fishes are not prepared to endorse unilateral
conservation regulation as a solution to the problem; and therefore
that the community of nations, however it defines the trend
away from tradition freedom of fishing, does not yet include unilateral conservation management within the new exceptions to the
doctrine.
66. See notes 24-28, supra, and accompanying text.
67. See Holt, supra note 27, at 190, 192; F. CHRiSTY & A. Scow, supra
note 16, at 102-03.
68. See Eisenbud, supra note 32, at 37-38. See also discussion supra
note 27.
69. See Bishop, The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 62 COLum. L. REv. 1206, 122021 (1962).
70. See note 13, supra.
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This reasoning is probably not sound. First of all, there is every
indication that the relative unpopularity of the Convention is due
not so much (if at all) to its allowance of unilateral conservation
management as it is to such other provisions as compulsory arbitration.7 1 Moreover, the force of the reasoning is substantially
mitigated by the fact that the Convention even exists: it was
approved in a very political international conference by a vote of
72
45 in favor, only one against, and with eighteen abstentions.
Finally, if the world community is not too bothered by the recent
inclination of some coastal nations to carve permanent exclusive
fishing zones out of the high seas, it cannot really be believed
that a temporary custodianship zone will be intolerable.
Therefore, freedom of fishing as a "legal" obstacle is, because
of its currently uncertain status, not overly difficult to answer.
A somewhat more troublesome argument is found in the chargecapable of being levied against at least some of the nations expected to take unilateral action-that single-nation control of high
seas fisheries is a breach of the actor nation's treaty obligations.
Treaty obligations, unlike customary norms of conduct, are after
all written down in black and white and solemnly entered into by
the parties. They would seem less easy to discard or ignore than
an obligation founded on the shifting tides of customary practice.7 3
The treaty most widely applicable to unilateral extensions of
fishery jurisdiction is of course the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas. In what has been termed a "codification" of the customary
doctrine,7 4 the High Seas Convention specifically provides that
71. Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59
COLum. L. REV. 234, 263 (1959); S~rensen, Law of the Sea 224-25 (International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 520, 1958); 5 U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Official Records 74-78 (A/Conf. 13/38) (1958).
72. See Bishop, supra note 69, at 1220.
73. See L. OPPENHEIm,

INTENATiONAL LAW (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed.

1948); J. BumsaTy, supra note 64, at 317-345. But, "treaties are legally binding because there exists a customary rule of International Law that treaties
are binding." L. OPPENHEm

, supra at 794.

74. Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations places on the General

Assembly the obligation to "initiate studies and make recommendations for
the purpose of . . . encouraging the progressive development of interna-

tional law and its codification." The General Assembly set up the International Law Commission (ILC) to carry out these tasks. Despite the recent lack of United States Government interest and leadership in the ILC,
the Commission, with Professor Francois of the Netherlands as Rapporteur,

freedom of the high seas (that is, all waters beyond the outer
limits of territorial seas") includes freedom to fish. 70 Forty-six
nations have signed and ratified this convention, 77 thereby binding
themselves by contract to recognize the right of all nations to unrestricted fishing of the high seas. Can a nation that has so
bound itself restrict fishing on the high seas, even as a temporary
custodian, without breaching this "contract"?
Individual nations have also entered into bilateral or multilateral treaties with other countries which define the parties' high
seas fishing rights with respect to one another. 78 Presumably
such a nation would, by declaring the exclusive right to regulate
fishing in the areas covered by these treaties, breach its treatyrecognitions of these rights. It is highly possible that it is these
same treaty parties-that is, those fishing in the area to be
managed-which the claimant nation wants to restrict or regulate.
A general response by the claimant nation might be to assert
the application of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine
arguably states that a treaty terminates with the appearance of
79
new and unforeseen circumstances attacking its very foundation.
(It is thus very much like the Anglo-American contracts doctrine
of frustration of purpose.8 0 ) This is, however, apparently a controversial principle, not well defined in international law.8 1 Furdid an admirable piece of work on the law of the sea. See Jessup, supra
note 71, at 235-36.
75. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (opened for signature Apr. 29,
1958). [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (in force
Sept. 10, 1964) (hereinafter cited as Convention on the Territorial Sea).
76. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 15, at art. 2 (2).
77. U.S. Dep't of State, TREATIES iN FORcE 324 (1971).
78. See, e.g., Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur
Seals (opened for signature Feb. 9, 1957), 1957 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No.
3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 (in force Oct. 14, 1957) [hereinafter cited as Fur
Seal Convention]; International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Feb. 8, 1949, [1950] 1 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S., 157
(in force July 3, 1950) [hereinafter cited as ICNAF Convention]; International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
May 9, 1952, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (in force
June 12, 1953) [hereinafter cited as North Pacific Fishing Convention].
79. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 64, at 335-39; L. OPPENHEIm, supra note 73,
at 843-50.
80. See generally A. Cottny, CONTRACTS 1128-41 (one volume edition,
1952).

81. We may well hold that the obligation of a treaty comes to an
end if an event happens which the parties intended, or which we

are justified in presuming they have intended, should put an end
to it; the more difficult problem concerns an obligation which the
parties did not intend to be ended, but which it would be oppressive to enforce, and which will probably in fact be violated, in the
events which have happened. It is because so many writers have
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thermore, it is doubtful that it is applicable so as to excise a part
of a treaty that has allegedly become obsolete; and it therefore
might not be usable by a claimant nation that wants simply to
avoid certain provisions of a treaty.8 2 For example, the claimant
nation may want to continue to adhere generally to freedom of the
high seas, as expressed in the High Seas Convention, and redefine
only freedom of fishing. It may want to take a similar attitude
toward its bilateral and multilateral fishing treaties. On the other
hand, rebus sic stantibus comes close to expressing doctrinally the
rationale of the claimant nation: a crisis exists because of new
circumstances, and a reasonable departure from the obligations
assumed under previous circumstances ought to be allowed.
Unfortunately for potential claimant nations that are parties to
bilateral or multilateral fishing treaties, the recent so-called
Treaty on Treaties8 3 takes a rather narrow view of the rebus sic
stantibus principle. The pertinent part of Article 62 ("fundamental change of circumstances") states that:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with

regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty;
and

(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent
84
of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

Is an overfishing-caused conservation crisis a "fundamental change
of circumstances"? Perhaps not; indeed, the fishing treaty may
have been motivated by a conservation crisis.8 5 Was such a crisis,
even if a "fundamental change," "not foreseen by the parties"?
Unless the treaty is very old, it is unlikely that a crisis, even if

recent, was entirely unforeseen. Was "essential basis of the consought to find in rebus sic stantibus a solution for this latter problem that the doctrine has become one of the most controversial in
international law.
J. BirERLY, supra note 64, at 338-39.
82. Id. at 339.

83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doe.

A/Conf. 39/27 [hereinafter cited as Treaty on Treaties]. Note that on
Nov. 22, 1971, President Nixon sought advice and consent of the Senate

to ratify the Treaty or Treaties. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 234 (1972).
84. Treaty on Treaties, supra note 83 at art. 62 § 1.
85. See treaties listed in note 78 supra.

sent of the parties" the existence of the same level of fishery
yield as existed at the time the treaty was concluded? In some
cases, it might be justifiably so argued. Is the effect of the conservation crisis "radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed under the treaty"? This would probably be
difficult to argue in most cases.
Therefore, if the potential claimant nation is a party to the
Treaty on Treaties, or if the Treaty on Treaties is acceptable as a
"codification" (or at least good evidence) of international law,8 0
the claimant nation will have trouble arguing rebus sic stantibus
in support of modifying or withdrawing from its fishing treaties.
It had better be prepared to look for help in its treaty's provisions
on termination and withdrawal and also to open negotiations for
87
treaty modification.
The High Seas Convention, which purports to express the customary understanding on freedom to fish,88 can be handled
slightly more easily. A convention designed to "codify" existing
but fluctuating principles should not be so interpreted as to
freeze those principles at any particular point in time unless this
is the clear intent of the parties. In general, and over the relatively long run, the norm-system we call the international law of
the sea is a responsive, dynamic system well attuned to the desires
of those it regulates. In some respects it is more responsive to
change than the agreement process (though this probably says
more in criticism of the agreement machinery than in praise of
the customary-change mechanism). Certainly the practice of nations indicates that the freedom-to-fish principle is changing in its
customary form, and the High Seas Convention is arguably being
interpreted by this practice.8 9
Despite these foreseeable difficulties with the "legal" obstacles
to unilateral fishery-protective action, the claimant nation is not
likely to be too worried about them-unless it agrees to take the
legality issue to the International Court or to arbitration. There
is probably enough in the arguments suggested above (and perhaps other arguments) to lend a color of legality to the action as
86. See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, 61 Am. 3.
Lf's. L. 253, 262 (1967), U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. I; Rosenne, The Temporal
Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 CORNELL
INT'LL.J. 1 (1970).
87. See, e.g., Fur Seal Convention, art. 12; ICNAF Convention, Art. 16;
North Pacific Fishing Convention, Art. II § 2.
88. The Preamble to the High Seas Convention, supra note 15, states
the parties' desire to "codify" customary high seas law.
89. See McDougal, supra note 65.
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it is discussed and debated in diplomatic correspondence, enough
to avoid the label of "wanton lawbreaker" or other similar labels.
It is unlikely that the claimant nation will choose to go to the
Court or to arbitration, since the odds, I would guess, would not
favor a determination of legality. So far, at least, nations making
extravagant or different types of unilateral claims of high seas
authority have apparently been advised to refuse to submit to a
formal test of legality.9 0 It is one of the many anomalies of the
international law system (though it is not unique in this respect),
that a series of seemingly "illegal" actions can eventually add up
to a general legality. Perhaps fortunately, coastal-nation control
of adjacent high seas fisheries is not yet a general legality.
B. Formulationof management methods.
Management problems, discussed briefly in this section and the
next one, are the practical difficulties that should cause a nation
with any real sense to forget entirely about taking unilateral
fishery-protective action in the high seas. Under even a large
and rich nation's custodianship, an extensive high seas fishery
is likely to be managed poorly at best; and, when poor management is added to the multi-layered objections to unilateral action
in general, it should be recognized that very few fishery "crises"
deserve that kind of trouble. Nevertheless, according to my initial
prediction, unilateral action will be taken soon, and the management problems might as well be faced.
The basic problem is, of course, how to cut down the fishing
"take" and so to allow the fishery's physical yield to build back
up. 91 (Economic yield might be a better focus, but a practically
impossible one for a unilaterally managed international fishery. 2 )
There are several methods for regulating the yield of a fishery,
once the authority to regulate exists or is recognized. Some are
unsuited to unilateral management, and others just might have a
chance. First, the unsuitable ones:
(1)

Quotas. Perhaps the best potential device for regulating

90. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 8, at 12; Wolff, Peruvian-United States
Relations over Fishing: 1945-1969, 14 (Law of the Sea Institute Occasional
Paper No. 4, 1970).
91. See discussion note 16 supra.
92. See Chapman, supra note 25, at 454; note 16 supra.

international fisheries is a system of national quotas. 93 While a
self-proclaimed custodian might set and publicize national quotas
for the nations active in the fishery, it will not be able to enforce
the quotas without constant boarding and inspecting of foreign
vessels, or very unlikely cooperation from all the nations where
landings are made. There are indications that quotas might work
under a scheme set up by agreement between the fishing nations9 4-landings could then be monitored at home ports-but
unilateralquota management is bound to fail.
(2) Gear restriction. A method of fishery conservation now
widely employed is gear restriction.9" Essentially the purpose of
restricting the types and amount of fishing equipment and gear
is to make the fisherman inefficient: make him fish with hooks
instead of nets; where he is allowed to fish with nets, regulate
the size of the mesh so a lot of fish will escape, and so on.00 With
such obstacles, the fisherman simply does not have enough time
to overfish. Aside from the rather obvious economic objections to
gear restriction (as well as its general silliness), ° as an international management method it must be classified with the quota
system: unless there is a great deal of cooperation among the
fishing nations, the surveillance required by the custodian nation
will be too expensive and risky. 8 Regular vessel-boarding and
inspection of gear would probably be a necessity.
(3) Limiting entry. The problem with limiting the number of
vessels in the fishery, and thereby reducing the catch, is perhaps
more political than practical.9 9 It might be barely feasible, for
93. STRATTON CoumIssioN REPoR 105-09; Crutchfield, National Quotas

for the North Atlantic Fisheries: An Exercise in Second Best, Proceedings

of the Third Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 263 (1969).
94. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension
of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River System May 26, 1930,

50 Stat. 1355, T.S. 918, 184 L.N.T.S. 305 [1937]; Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering
Sea Mar. 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900, 22 U.N.T.S. 77 (in force July
13, 1950).
95. See, e.g., 4 Oms. REv. STAT. §§ 509.360-509.385 (1971); 75 REv. CODE
WAsH. 12.040-12.080 (1968); ICNAF Convention Art. VIII(1) (d).
96. Bevan, Methods of Fishery Regulation, THE Fisnmzms: PROBLEMS IN
RFsou cE MANAGEMENT 37-39 (U. Crutchfield ed., 1965); J. CRUTCHRm1LD &
G. PoNTEcoRvo, supra note 30, at 40-47; J. CRuTcHFILD & A. ZELLNER, supra
note 15, at 29-37; STRATTON PALn REPORT 3, supra note 33, at VIII 48-50.
97. Bevan, supra note 96, at 38-39; F. CHnsTY & A. ScOTT, supra note 16,

at 6-16; 3. Crutchfield & G. Pontecorvo, supra note 30, at 40-47.
98. Arglen, Problems of Enforcement of Fisheries Regulations, Proceed-

ings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 19,

22 (1968); Carroz & Roche, The InternationalPolicing of High Seas Fisheries, 6 CAN. Y.B. INT'L 61, 86-87 (1968).
99. There is no question but what there is validity to the conten-
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a powerful custodian nation anyway, to license only a certain number of well-marked vessels of the various fishing nations and
then patrol the fishery to exclude unlicensed boats. Limiting
entry, however, means telling people (and, assuming an extreme
overfishing crisis, a lot of people) to do something else for a
living-or at least to fish someplace else. A custodian nation
might be able to set up some sort of program to induce or require
its own fishermen to accept limited entry, but foreign fishing
nations-who will not readily accept any kind of restriction-will
probably rebel, to the extent that enforcement will again be impossible. And the mechanics of fairly limiting entry (a slow
phase-out, vessel and gear-reimbursement program, for example)100 are undoubtedly too complex and expensive for a temporary unilateral management.
There are, on the other hand, some methods of fish conservation
that would be less difficult for a single-nation custodian to operate:
(4) Season restrictions. Along with gear restriction, season
restrictions, (prohibiting fishing during certain times of the year)
are currently in wide use as a conservation mechanism.101 And,
like gear restrictions, season restrictions (where their purpose is
simply cutting down the harvest of a fishery) supposedly work
because they promote inefficiency: if the fishermen are catching
too many fish, let them fish less often. It is probably the easiest
of the traditional conservation methods to enforce in that it is relatively simple to determine whether a violation is occurring. No
tion that the wastage of fishing effort used beyond the point of

maximum net economic yield should be avoided. It appears to me,
however, that this is a second order problem that is so difficult to
solve from the political and diplomatic standpoint that it should
not be tackled seriously until the conservation, that is maximizing
the physical yield, problem is a little better in hand.
Chapman, supra note 25, at 451.
100. See, e.g., Christy, The Distributionof the Sea's Wealth in Fisheries,
THE LAW Or THE SEA: OFFSHORE BomDARIEs AND ZoNES 106, 116-120 (L.
Alexander ed., 1967); J. CRUTCHIELD & G. PONTEcORVO, supra note 30, at
177-79; Mead, Discussion-Symposium on the Appropriate Role of Limitation of Entry as a Method of Managing Marine Fisheries, Proceedings of
the Fifth Meeting of the Governor's Advisory Commission on Ocean Re-

sources (California) 114 (1966).
101. See Bevan, supra note 96, at 34-35; J. CRUTC]IFELD & G. PoxTEcORvo,
supra note 30, at 42-44; J. CRUTCHFIELD & A. ZELER, supra note 15, at
35-37, 118-121 (STRATTON PANEl REPORT 3, supra note 33, at VIII-49.

boarding of vessels is generally required. The custodian nation's
patrol officers need to know, of course, how to determine whether
a fishing vessel is fishing for the controlled species (not always
easy), but this determination should not usually require boarding. 0 2 Otherwise, the patrol officers only have to know what
time of year it is.
(5) Area restrictions. The device of closing off areas, rather
than seasons, from fishing is something within the experience of
most fishing nations. 03 After all, an exclusive fishing zone or
territorial sea is nothing more or less than an area closure. The
method is slightly more difficult to enforce-again in the violationdetermination sense-than season restrictions because of the problem of drawing geographical lines at sea.'0 4 On the other hand, it
has the advantage of limiting the total surveillance area.
Two more attributes of both season and area restrictions can
be noted: (a) the two methods can be combined, and (b) either
or both can be readily manipulated to allow a measure of coastalnation preference; the custodian can allow its own vessels longer
seasons, or wider areas, or both.
A major problem with any conservation method is the requirement that the manager know a great deal about the regulated
fish before it can intelligently set restrictions. This means knowledge on size, yield, migration patterns, feeding habits, growth
rates, ecological interdependencies, etc.10 Without such scientific
knowledge, regulation tends to be haphazard at best. And, because the knowledge is scarce and expensive to obtain by investigation and monitoring, even current management policies, both
domestic and international, are seldom based on adequate scientific knowledge. 0 6 It is probably too much to expect more from
a single-nation custodian. It is no doubt unrealistic to expect even
as much, since accurate control of harvesting requires monitoring
of catches and landings, impossible to carry out without active
cooperation of the fishery participants.
102. See Aglen, supra note 98, at 21.
103. For a description of area closures and how they operate, see Bevan,
supra note 96, at 34; STRATTON PANEL REPORT 3, supra note 33, at VIII-49.
104. Aglen, supra note 98, at 21; Carroz & Roche, supra note 98, at 85-87.
See Orlin, Positioning on the Continental Shelf, Proceedings of the Third
Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute 156 (1969).
105. See ConvassloN ON MAmaIE ScIENcE, ENGINEERING, AND RESOURCES,
PANEL REPORT, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, H.R. Doc. No. 91-42, Part I,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 1-30 (1969).
106. See generally STRATTON PANEL REPORT 3, supra note 33, at VIII 5154; Chapman, supra note 25, at 442-44.
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Obtaining knowledge is not the only expensive component of a
management program. Administration and enforcement are expensive activities. 10
License fees and fines for violations are
likely to be major sources of income for the program's expenses,
and it is probably safe to say that, for most countries, the success
of the conservation management will turn upon the ability of the
custodian to collect its fees and fines.
C. Enforcement problems.
The difficulties of policing a unilaterally proclaimed high seas
fishery zone are immense. The problems are essentially related to
the necessity to patrol a potentially vast area of open, hostile sea.
Hostile is the word for the physical environment as well as the
attitudes of the distant-water foreign fishermen likely to be encountered. It will of course be impossible to employ a saturation
method of enforcement-one that will discover and punish every
violation. The United States says it now has trouble finding the
resources to effectively police its twelve-mile fisheries zone. 08 It
is not likely that a nation with fewer resources will be able to do
a better job in a more extensive management area. Even if saturation or near-saturation policing were possible, the cost would
almost certainly outweigh the conservation benefits.
Still, some kind of enforcement will be necessary if a management program is to have a chance of success. Although the
extent of enforcement required might be mitigated by the custodian nation's demonstration of good faith and the "good sense" of
its management program for the benefit of all, voluntary cooperation in any unilateral program-no matter how much sense it
makes-should not be anticipated.
So considering that really effective enforcement is probably
impossible, what are the options open to the custodian-manager?
Enforcement problems can be divided into two kinds: (1) violation determination, and (2) sanctions. The custodian's enforcement options must deal with each.
As indicated in the preceding section, discovery or determination
of violations can be aided considerably by the choice of conserva107. See note 106 supra.
108. STRATTON PANEL REPORT 3, supra note 33, at VIII 55.

tion methods. Season and area restrictions are probably the
most feasible methods for unilateral management (other than
outright exclusion of foreign fishermen, a method obviously not
recommended here). But even the relatively simple discovery of
fishing at the wrong place or the wrong time requires surveillance
effort. The offender must be spotted and, moreover, must be
seen to be fishing for the controlled fish. Few countries have a
fleet of surface vessels sufficient for surveillance of an extensive
area of high seas. 10 9 Where the area to be policed is broad,
aircraft can be of great value, although surface craft will still be
necessary for apprehension. 1" 0 It is, as noted, not realistic to expect to discover and apprehend every violation. But it would
seem that the risk of apprehension would have to be relatively
great if violators are to be deterred. Perhaps an occasional
esurprise" saturation effort would be sufficient. Alternatively,
continuous patrolling with a limited fleet in a haphazard areapattern is a possibility. Application of the area-restriction conservation method would of course assist the surveillance fleet by
cutting down the total area to be patromed. 11 Nevertheless, violation-determination is, for nearly all (if not all) countries, a
very substantial stumbling block in the way of effective conservation management.
But assume a sufficient percentage of violators can be discovered. What are the realistic options for sanctions to be imposed on
foreign fishermen or nations? The following alternatives, alone
or in conjunction with each other, might be considered:
(1) License revocation or suspension. If the offense is committed by a vessel licensed by the custodian, its license might be
revoked or suspended. There are at least a couple of things
wrong with this sanction: (a) it does not help meet the primary
enforcement problem of fishing by unlicensed boats; and (b) the
revocation or suspension itself must be enforced.
(2) Fines. Imposition of fines, supported by vessel seizures
and cargo confiscation, is of course a method now employed by
unilateral managers, with uncertain measures of success. 1 2 Much
would seem to depend on the ability of the custodian's policing
force to spot, apprehend 13and force the offender to port where the
penalty can be assessed.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See NATIONAL FIs=m , Feb., 1972, § A, at 3, 27.
Aglen, supra note 98, at 22.
Id., Carroz &Roche, supra note 96, at 85.
Lecouna, supra note 5, at 110.
Carroz &Roche, supra note 98, at 79-80.
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(3) Imprisonment. Vessel captains and crews could be imprisoned for violating the custodian's regulations, but this would
be risky in that it would be likely to lead to reprisals or at least to
heightened resistance by the world community as a whole to the
custodian's proclaimed authority.
(4) Economic sanctions. Depending upon its economic and
trade relationships with the nation of the offending fisherman and
on the extent to which his violation reflects an attitude or policy
of his country, the custodian might impose economic sanctions
against the fishermen's nation. These might range from minor
trade reductions and increased tariffs, through boycotts and embargoes. 114 Economic sanctions cannot be undertaken lightly,
however, since they tend to affect adversely the economic position
of the sanction-imposer also.1 15
(5) Diplomatic sanctions. Again depending upon the circumstances surrounding the relationships of the two nations, diplomatic sanctions could, in a serious case, be imposed against the
offending nation. Such sanctions might include a spectrum of
restrictions on the openness of relations between the two countries-travel restrictions, cultural-exchange restrictions, and so on
-and range up to withdrawal of diplomatic recognition. 1 6 But
matters would have to be pretty grim to warrant the last.
(6) Occupation of territory and war. Fortunately, disputes
over the right to fishery resources are not yet likely to lead to
114. See Loring, supra note 5, at 440-41, 448-49; Note, 6 SAw DIEGO L.

RPv. 443 (1969). The United States has taken recent action toward protecting its conservation programs for Atlantic salmon of North American
origin by imposing economic sanctions on any country whose nationals
endanger those programs. Act of Dec. 23, 1971, PUB. L. No. 92-219.
115. This would certainly be true for the United States. For example:
New retaliation against Peru, particularily if the United States
should close its markets to Peruvian fish and fish products, will
almost certainly bring Peruvian retaliation against United States
fishing investment's in Peru ....
United States-controlled companies produce roughly one-fourth of Peru's fishmeal; the annual
value of their product on is about $70 million-nearly the total
value of all United States tuna landings. These companies ...

have no interest in tuna, but would like to keep foreigners away
from the anchovy fishery, which extends beyond 12 miles, and
would like to maintain good relations with the Peruvian government.
Loring, supra note 5, at 427-28.
116. See VoN GLAmH, LAW Am ONG NATIONS, Chapter 24 (2d ed. 1970).

the use of force to occupy land territory or go to war.117 We
should hope they never will be.
All in all, enforcement problems probably stand as the largest
of the large obstacles in the way of successful unilateral fisheries
management on the high seas. The fishery crisis should be quite
severe to warrant the expenditure of effort and risk necessary
for adequate policing.
D. Risk of over-response by other nations.
It has already been pointed out above 1 8 that the 1945 Truman
Proclamation undoubtedly formed the initial precedent (or "excuse") for the subsequent unilateral jurisdictional extensions into
the high seas. As a precedent, the Proclamations were not carefully followed. The Proclamation on the Continental Shelf was
specifically limited to jurisdiction over the resources of the seabed and did not purport to alter the status of the water above the
shelf. 1 9 The Second Proclamation provided only for future fish1 20
ery conservation zones and anticipated international agreement.
The claims that have supposedly followed the lead of the Truman
Proclamations have often gone far beyond these limitations.' 2 '
The Latin American 200-mile claims to some sort of sovereignty
are the grossest examples.
The point is this: although the custodian's purpose in following
the guidelines set out above would be to preserve a resource for
ultimate international management, its unilateral declaration
might well undermine the chances for international agreement
by triggering other unilateral claims not limited by the suggested
guidelines. Permanent extensions of varying aspects of jurisdictional authority or sovereignty might occur, and thus the unfortunate effect of the custodian's action would be to accelerate
the national-lake trend rather than to forestall it.
E. Other problems.
The list of obstacles and difficulties just summarized is obviously
not exhaustive; it is thought to represent the major problems
to be faced by any nation that attempts to declare a temporary
custodianship of a high seas fishery. Particular nations will have
117. Chapman, supra note 25, at 454.
118. See text accompanying note 4, supra.

119. Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, supra note 4.
120. Truman Proclamation on Fisheries, supra note 11.

121. See Wolff, supra note 90, at 7. See also note 5, supra.
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special problems or especially severe versions of the problems already suggested. For example, a nation with a relatively narrow
coastline can expect to have greater difficulty establishing authority over a fishery stock whose "adjacency" is shared by neighboring nations. Or, an economically developing nation will undoubtedly experience more trouble than a richer nation in effectively policing a broad-ranging species and in scientifically monitoring the physical yield for conservation purposes. Much will
also depend on the nature of the regulated species: a relatively
localized fishery, for instance, should be easier to manage than
a highly migratory oceanic species.
And the administrative problems-the heavy burden of the
everyday management responsibility for an internationally shared
resource-should, even if international cooperation were assumed,
be enough to give the strongest-willed nation great pause before
undertaking the task.
VII.

CoNcusioN

It is time for me to admit recognition of the possibility that few
(maybe none) of the nations now contemplating extensions of
unilateral fisheries jurisdiction really care to become custodians
for the international community. It is more likely, despite some
assertions to the contrary, that each of these nations simply
wants to preserve for itself a greater share of a dwindling resource. The simplest, most direct method for doing this is to join
the legitimizing trend of carving out a greater portion of adjacent
ocean space for an exclusive fishing zone.
Still, it must at some point be seen that a march of individual
permanent jurisdictions toward a common center can only postpone the time when the real problems, then to be confronted in
full-blown maturity, must be faced. And by then it may be too
late for truly effective solutions.
International agreement on detailed management schemes that
fairly apportion the benefits and provide for adequate enforcement and scientific monitoring is the only true solution for endangered high seas fisheries. Given time, the world fishing community will certainly have to acknowledge this. It is not impossible that some of the nations now and to be engaged in the
march of unilateral claims already recognized the superior virtue

in international management, but that they feel compelled to
act now. Who can really blame them? The immediately foreseeable future, despite the promise of the 1973 Law of the Sea
Conference, does not seem to hold an effective response to the
felt threat of overfishing.
For those nations that feel an irresistible urge to meet the
frustration by grabbing while the grabbing's good, I have suggested an alternative to the annexation of new wet territory. It
is not an earth-shaking proposition. It simply asks that nations
unilaterally act only in response to true over-fishing crises, and
only to becoming temporary, relatively non-discriminating custodians of the endangered resources, while we all await the coming
of the International Solution.
It might not work. But it should be better than participating
in the carving up of an old friend.

